No. ~~85417-3~~ 89927-4

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DAWUD AHMAD, BEDREDDIN IMAN and SAMEER HATEM,

and

MUSLIM AMERICA, Appellants,

v.

TOWN OF SPRINGDALE, a municipal corporation,

Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO APPELLANT BEDREDDIN IMAN AND SAMEER HATEM'S PETITION FOR REVIEW

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I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent Town of Springdale ("Town" or "Respondent") requests that Petitioners Bedreddin Iman and Sameer Hatem's (collectively, "Appellants") petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court of the Court of Appeals' decision terminating review and the Court of Appeals' decision denying Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration (the "Decision") in this matter be denied as said review is unnecessary and unjustified under RAP 13.4(b).

II. NATURE OF CASE AND DECISION

This is a case about the Stevens County Superior Court's denial of Appellants' applications for the issuance of a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus against the Town. Appellants have had full use of the building which is the subject of this action throughout this case. No deprivation of any constitutional right of appellants to practice religion has occurred in this case.

Respondent understands that appellant Iman at the commencement of the case resided in, and since has resided in and occupied the building on the Muslim America property. The building is a shed with no facilities or utilities. The property is also improved with a single family residence in which Dawud Ahmad and his family and appellant Hatem apparently

reside. Appellants claim that appellant Iman can live in the shed because he is indigent and homeless.

The Town by mail sent a letter to Dawud Ahmad requesting that Muslim America obtain a "business license." The original applications for writs included claims about the business license. Appellants subsequently withdrew these claims in their writ applications stating, in part:

> Defendants' two Notices of Infraction are *in limine* at the Stevens County District Court, where plaintiff Ahmad (there defendant) seeks relief; the District Court is not within reach of this action; and a plain and speedy remedy is available in the District Court, disqualifying this issue from this Writ action.

(CP 126-128).

The Affidavit of Dawud Ahmad (CP 011-013) referred to a "miscellaneous incident report" undescribed and unattached (paragraph 12) and also said he received an "unsafe structure notice" from the Town. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit 6 to appellant Iman's Memorandum in Support of Application for Writ of Prohibition. (CP 031). The Town also sent a letter to Muslim America on April 14, 2010, directed to appellant Hatem, advising that the occupancy of the shed on the property was in violation of Town Ordinances. (CP 068). A citation was issued by the Town on April 26, 2010, but was withdrawn by letter of April 30, 2010, to Muslim America (CP 150-151).

On or about April 7, 2010, Appellant Bedreddin Iman together with Dawud Ahmad filed an application for writ of prohibition (CP 08-10). As noted above, the Court application was revised to remove the business license claim. By subsequent motion and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend (CP 250-251), the application added a request for writ of mandamus. Subsequently, on or about May 28, 2010, Appellants Sameer Hatem moved to join the case as a plaintiff. The order granting joinder was entered by the trial court on June 30, 2010. (CP 304).

Appellants sought a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Town from enforcing the provisions of the State Building Code related to the required components of an occupied building on real property. They sought a writ of mandamus mandating that the Town pass an ordinance exempting said building under RCW 19.27.042.

After Appellants Ahmad and Iman had served their application for writs upon the Town, it appeared and filed an Answer. After it filed its answer, the Town discovered that the subject building was on real property not owned by any Appellant. It was owned by Muslim America. Defendant Town moved for joinder of Muslim America as owner of the real property and the building. The trial court granted this motion by order entered June 15, 2010. (CP 252-253).

The trial court made and entered Findings, Conclusions and Order. (CP 401-405). The Court ruled that the Appellants were not entitled to a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Town from enforcing the State Building Code within the limits of the Town as is mandated by RCW 19.27.031, and RCW 19.27.050. The Court ruled that the Appellants failed to meet the writ of prohibition requirements because they did not show that the Town was acting in excess of its jurisdiction, Appellants failed to show they had no other adequate or speedy remedy at law, and because the true party in interest, Muslim America, had not shown its beneficial interest as it had not filed an affidavit declaring its beneficial interest in support of the request for the writ of prohibition.

With respect to the application for writ of mandamus, the Trial Court ruled that Appellants were not entitled to a writ of mandamus forcing the Town to enact an ordinance exempting the Muslim America property and building from the operation of the State Building Code under RCW 19.27.042. The trial court held that the Appellants had not proven that RCW 19.27.042 was non-discretionary because the statute itself on its face indicates that the exemption is discretionary, or that Appellants did not have an adequate and speedy remedy at law, as they could fully defend any future enforcement action on the basis that it impaired the exercise of religion, and Muslim America, the owner of the land and the building, the

only party that can apply to the Town for the exemption under 19.27.042, and the only party who had applied to the Town for the exemption as a non-profit corporation owning the subject structures, had filed no affidavit of beneficial interest in support of the application for writ.

The Town filed a Motion for an Order Awarding Costs and Attorney's Fees for Frivolous Action (CP 406-408). After hearing, the Court ruled in the Town's favor and entered a Judgment and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Award of Reasonable Expenses Including Fees of Attorney under RCW 4.84.185. (CP 562-566).

The Court concluded that all the writ claims asserted in the case were advanced frivolously and without reasonable cause and were without merit. The Court based this on findings that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus. Regarding the prohibition writ, the plaintiffs did not support their claim for issuance of a writ of prohibition by rational argument on the law or on the facts that showed that the Town was acting in excess of its jurisdiction because the Town has an absolute statutory obligation to enforce the State Building Code, plaintiffs admitted they had a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law, and the property and building owner plaintiff Muslim America filed no affidavit of beneficial interest or any other facts to support the application for the writ. Regarding the

mandamus writ, plaintiffs did not support their claim for issuance of a writ of mandamus by any rational argument on the law or on the facts because the exemption authorized under RCW 19.27.042 is clearly discretionary on the face of the statute, plaintiffs admitted they had a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law, and plaintiff Muslim America, the owner of the land and the building, filed no affidavit of beneficial interest or any other facts supporting the application for the writ. Further, the Court specifically found that the statements of plaintiff Ahmad, in a letter to the Town of Springdale, attached to the Declaration of Mayor Buche, contained an assertion the Town could dismiss the action and end the case, thus admitting that all the pleadings filed in this action were frivolous. (CP 465-471). The court specifically found that statement constituted an admission that the action in its entirety was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. The Court awarded the Town $23.916.66 in fees and costs and awarded them a cost award of $200 statutory attorney's fees per plaintiff.

Muslim America did not appeal the trial court's final decision regarding the writ claims and is not an appellant as to those claims.

III. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES

Respondent in this matter entirely disagrees with the four issues advanced by the Appellants in their Petition for Review. The issues are:

A. Whether the Trial Court property denied the Appellants' requests for writ of prohibition on the basis that the Town was not acting in excess of its jurisdiction, Muslim America filed no affidavit of beneficial interest and the Appellants had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law?

B. Whether the Trial Court properly denied the Appellants' request for a writ of mandamus on the basis that the Town had no affirmative duty to adopt a discretionary amendment to the State Building Code, Muslim America filed no affidavit of beneficial interest, and the Appellants had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law?

C. Whether the Trial Court properly granted the Town's motion for an order awarding costs and attorney's fees for frivolous action on the basis that the Appellants' action was advanced without reasonable cause, cannot be supported by any rational argument on the law or the facts and the entire action is frivolous?

IV. ARGUMENT

A. RAP 13.4(b) CONTAINS SPECIFIC STANDARDS AND THE APPELLANTS IN THIS MATTER CANNOT MEET ANY OF THEM.

RAP 13.4(b) states:

> (b) **Considerations Governing Acceptance of Review**. A petition for review will be accepted by the Supreme Court only:
>
> (1) if the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; or
>
> (2) If the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with another decision of the Court of Appeals; or
>
> (3) If a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States is involved; or
>
> (4) if the petition involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the Supreme Court.

RAP 13.4(b)(1)-(4). Appellants fail to specifically cite these subsections of RAP 13.4(b) in support of their argument seeking discretionary review. It appears that the Appellants are proceeding under RAP 13.4(b)(1) (Court of Appeals decision conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court), RAP 13.4(b)(3) (significant question of law under the Constitution of the United States is involved), and RAP 13.4(b)(4) (issue of substantial public interest should be determined by the Supreme Court).

1. There is no conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and a decision of the Supreme Court.

On page 11 of their Petition, in Section V., Subsection B., Appellants assert denial of standing under RLUIPA conflicts with decisions of the Supreme Court. They assert this is so because the Supreme Court has held in *Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airport*, 146 Wn.2d 207, 212 (fn. 3), 45 P.3d 18 (2002) that standing is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised for the first time on appeal and the Court of Appeals did not reach the standing argument. This is incorrect. The Court of Appeals said:

> Next, regarding standing, a party waives a standing issue by not raising it at trial. *State v. Cardenis*, 146 Wn.2d 400, 404-05, 47 P.3d 127, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002). The individual plaintiffs failed to argue standing below. Moreover, corporations appearing in court must be represented by an attorney; the individual plaintiffs appearing pro se failed to meet this requirement. *Cottringer v. Dep't of Emp. Sec.*,

162 Wn. App. 787, 257 P.3d 667, *rev. denied*, 173 Wn.2d 1005 (2011).

Appendix A to Appellants' Petition for Review, p. 5. There is no conflict between the Decision and prior Supreme Court decisions.

Appellants point out the case *City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, Washington*, 97 Wn.2d 1, 630 P.2d 1358 (1982), and quote from its contents. Respondent has reviewed said case and finds nowhere in it the language Appellants quote. Moreover, *City of Sumner* was decided nearly eighteen years before RLIUPA was adopted. As well, in The *City of Sumner* case, the City of Sumner, unlike here, did enforce the State Building Code. It sought to enjoin the use of a basement of a church building as a school for violation of the City's Building Code and Zoning Ordinance. There is no conflict.

In Section V., Subsection C., Appellants assert that the lower court's determination of an adequate remedy at law conflicts with decisions of the Supreme Court. (Petition for Review, page 14). Appellants cite to *City of Kirkland v. Ellis*, 82 Wn. App. 819, 920 P.2d 206, and *State v. Harris*, 2 Wn. App. 272, 469 P.2d 937 (1970), and *State ex rel. Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court of King County*, 26 Wn.2d 740, 175 P.2d 640 (1946). Only the latter is a Supreme Court case and none of said cases conflict with the Decision.

With respect to a plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law, an applicant for a writ is required to identify that there is something in the nature of the action that makes it apparent that the rights of the litigants will not be protected or full redress will not be afforded without the writ. *State ex rel. O'Brien v. Police Court*, 14 Wn.2d 340, 347-48, 128 P.2d 332 (1942). The courts describe the adequacy of a remedy requirement as follows:

> A remedy is **not** inadequate merely because it is attendant with delay, expense, annoyance or even some hardship. There must be something in the nature of the action that makes it apparent that the rights of the litigants will not be protected or full redress will not be afforded without the writ.

City of Kirkland v. Ellis, 82 Wn. App. 819, 827, 920 P.2d 206 (1996) (emphasis added). Furthermore, if an available judicial review path is provided for, a writ of prohibition shall not lie. *City of Moses Lake v. Grant County Boundary Review Board*, 104 Wn. App. 388, 393, 15 P.3d 716 (2001). As the Superior Court and the Court of Appeals properly noted, Appellants' claims could be asserted in defense of an enforcement action, if any, and that is Iman and Hatem's plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law. This was admitted by Mr. Ahmad, speaking for himself and Iman and Hatem at oral argument on July 9, 2010, where he admitted

they had an adequate and speedy remedy at law. (VRP, July 9, 2010, p. 38, ll. 23-25; p. 39, ll. 1-2).

The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals looked at all applicable cases on the issue of plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law and made their determination. Appellants admit they provided the *Ellis* and *Harris* cases to the Court of Appeals. There is no indication that the determination of the Court of Appeals did not take this law into consideration. Further, *City of Kirkland v. Ellis, State v. Harris* and *State ex rel Western Canadian Greyhound Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court of King County,* all address whether appeals are adequate remedies. That is not at issue in this case.

As well, in the *Ellis* case, at issue was a district court determination to continue a trial. The Supreme Court held that because the continuance issue arose as a procedural pre-trial issue, and because of the then nature and scope of a trial *de novo*, the Superior Court could not consider the propriety of the continuance. No such facts exist in this case.

There is no conflict with the decisions of this Court.

2. This is not a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States.

This is a case about the Appellants' failure to satisfy the legal requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus and a writ of

prohibition and whether or not their case was frivolous. Nothing more. This is not the exceptional sort of case to which RAP 13.4(b)(3) applies.

Appellants' attempt to manufacture a significant question of law by claiming this case involves the constitutional right to free exercise of religion. This fails for four reasons. First, Appellants have not been deprived of the right to exercise their religion at all. They have at all times in this case used the shed to house Appellant Iman. Second, as admitted by the Appellants at the hearing in this matter, if the Town issues a notice of infraction of the State Building Code and proceeds with the District Court action to enforce it, Appellants will have an adequate opportunity to present a defense that the enforcement of the State Building Code, if it requires non-use of the building, impairs their constitutional right. Third, the actual owner of the property, Muslim America, did not appeal the Trial Court's writ order and has never declared a beneficial interest. Fourth, only Muslim America can apply for the ordinance available under 19.27.042 as a nonprofit entity.

The standards for the issuance of either of these writs are long-established and well-developed. This is a garden variety case applying the basic elements for both a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus.

Since this case does not in any way, shape or form involve any violation of the Constitutional right to exercise religion, but is rather about

the standards for issuance of the two writs, it does not create any significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or the United States. Appellants' requests under Section V., Subsections A. and B. of their Petition should be denied.

Defendants further assert in Subsection C. that the lower court's determination of an adequate remedy at law raises a significant question of constitutional law. The Appellants cite no provision of the state or federal Constitution to support this claim. As well, on page 15 of their Petition for Review, the Appellants state:

> Given their standing under RLUIPA, were Appellants summoned to Court as a result of the Town's Notice of Violation, the action would be unquestionably dismissed upon applying the criteria defined in *Kirkland* and *Harris*.

Petition for Review, p. 15, last full paragraph. Thus, while improperly citing to *Kirkland* and *Harris*, Appellants nevertheless admit defense of any action to enforce the State Building Code would be an adequate remedy.

In Section V., Subsection D., Appellants assert that the Trial Court's determination that this action was frivolous disregards the Town's violation of constitutional law. Again, Appellants cite to no state or federal constitutional provision to support their claim. They cite no case law to support this claim. *Habitat Watch v. Skagit County*, 155 Wn.2d

397, 120 P.3d 56 (2005). They appear to argue that there is a constitutional claim because the Court's entry of an order on frivolity, resulting in a judgment against the defendants "serves to diminish the gravitas of constitutional law." They provide no explanation of how or why. They do not show how this is a significant question of law.

3. The petition asserts no issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the State Supreme Court.

Appellants point to no evidence in the record or information capable of judicial notice which demonstrates their claimed issue, violation of their constitutional right to free exercise of religion, is recurring in nature or impacts a large number of persons. In Section V., subsection A., Petitioners recite the Court of Appeals' decision. They cite concerns that are specific to the Appellants only.[1]

The Appellants then assert that they wish to work with the Town. This does not show substantial public interest. It merely confirms the position of the Town that RCW 19.27.042 is discretionary. Appellants assert that they made an argument to the Court that the Town never legally

[1] The Court should not consider and/or strike Appellants argument at: the balance of the first full paragraph on page 9 starting with the sentence, "Additionally, they are demonstrably cost-prohibitive to Appellants, and footnote 5. These arguments were not made in the trial court and are waived on appeal. RAP 2.5; *Marriage of Buecking*, 179 Wn.2d 438, 454-55, ___ P.3d ___ (2013). There is no evidence in the record to support these assertions. RAP 10.4(f). *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). They are not supported by any citation to the law. *Habitat Watch v. Skagit County*, 155 Wn.2d 397, 120 P.3d 56 (2005).

adopted the SBC. This is not a matter of substantial public interest. It is also irrelevant, in light of RCW 19.27.050, which mandates the Town enforce the State Building Code, whether or not the Town adopts it.

Appellants assert that no enforcement action on behalf of the Town is necessary. By footnote they refer to RCW 35A.21.360. 35A.21.360 is not applicable to the Town as it does not operate under Title 35A RCW. RCW 35.01.040. This argument, based on a June 10, 2010, statute, was not asserted to the Trial Court and therefore should not be heard on appeal. RAP 2.5; *Marriage of Buecking*, 179 Wn.2d at 454-55. The Appellants fail to cite any provision of the State or Federal Constitution or any State or federal case law to support this claim. Claims made without case citation should not be considered by the Court. *Habitat Watch v. Skagit County, supra.* No substantial public interest is shown.

In Section V., Subsection B., Appellants make no showing that the question of standing "involves an issue of substantial public interest." (Petition for Review, p. 11). Again, the Town has not sought to enforce a land use regulation against the Appellants.

In Section V., Subsection B., Appellants assert there is substantial public interest in the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision regarding frivolity. The determination of frivolity only applies to this case. It only applies to these Appellants. Appellants claim that there is an issue of

substantial public interest in that it "punishes a party with crippling pecuniary sanctions simply for seeking in good faith a Court's equitable relief from disturbance of his religion under color of law."[2] (Petition for Review, p. 16). This is an incorrect characterization of the Trial and Appellate Court's frivolity determination. This is a writ case, not an interference with constitutionally protected practice of religion case. Appellants have full use of the building and have in fact housed Mr. Iman. The improper application under writ law resulted in the frivolity order.

The Appellants spend the remainder of Section V., Subsection B., taking issue with the basis for the Court's determinations on various aspects of the elements of frivolity. Appellants fail to show any substantial public interest in any of these claims.

Turning to said claims, Appellants claim there are issues about their failure to assign error to findings of fact in this case, whether the Town's lack of enforcement is a bar to their claim assertion, whether the Court of Appeals was in error because it found that the Appellants had conceded a remedy at law exists for them, whether the Court of Appeals' judgment with respect to frivolity in the Trial Court and on appeal is unlawful, and the consequences of their inability to pay the judgment on

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[2] The assertion of "crippling pecuniary sanctions" should not be considered or should be stricken. There is no evidence in the record to support it. RAP 10.4(f). *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, 118 Wn.2d at 809. It was not made in the Trial Court. RAP 2.5; *Marriage of Buecking*, 179 Wn.2d at 454-55.

frivolity.[3] None of these issues have any ramifications beyond the parties to and the particular facts of this case.

4. Appellants, as persons not licensed to practice law, Continue to Advocate on Behalf of Muslim America.

Appellants Iman and Hatem, both not licensed attorneys, have also violated *Cottringer v. Dept. of Emp. Sec.*, 162 Wn. App. 782, 787, 257 P.3d 667, *rev. denied*, 173 Wn.2d 1005 (2011), by including in their Petition for Review assertions and arguments on behalf of Muslim America. The following portions of the Appellants' Petition for Review should be disregarded by the Court and/or stricken on this basis: (1) Page 4, last sentence of first full paragraph; (2) Page 5, second full sentence commencing with the words "Over Appellants' objection . . ." ; (3) Page 7, top, phrase "Convincing attorney Jeffry Finer to appear, write and submit an opening brief on behalf of Muslim America just shy of the deadline for so doing"; (4) Page 9, first full paragraph after the word "cities"; (5) Page 9, second full paragraph; (6) Page 10, first full paragraph; (7) Page 12, sentences, "Appellants are not merely guests on Muslim America's property" "their use thereof is sanctioned by Muslim

[3] The consequences of inability to pay the judgment should not be considered and should be stricken. The assertions on page 17 of "heavy pecuniary damages" (first full paragraph, last sentence) and the last full paragraph on page 19 and the top of page 20 were not made in the Trial Court; RAP 2.5; *Marriage of Buecking*, 179 Wn.2d at 454-55; there is no evidence in the record to support any of them. RAP 10.4(f); *Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley*, *supra*; they are not supported by any citation to the law. *Habitat Water v. Skagit County*, *supra*.

America as affirmed by Mr. Hatem in his affidavit." (CP 35, § 4, 6). "Because Appellants are applying a religious land use on Muslim America's land, they have standing under the RLUIPA"; (8) Page 12, last full paragraph and footnote 7; (9) Page 13, first full paragraph.

B. THE TOWN REQUESTS CONDITIONAL REVIEW.

In the event the Court grants review, Respondents hereby request the Supreme Court review the Court of Appeals' determination not to grant the Respondents' attorney's fees on appeal. RAP 13.4(d), *Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & Sons*, 120 Wn.2d 712, 895 P.2d 987 (1993). The Appellants appeal was entirely frivolous and the Court of Appeals decision is not in accord with the law. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court decision that the action was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. The Court of Appeals recognized the Appellants were asserting that their action was not frivolous because they raised constitutional free exercise claims. The Court of Appeals addressed that claim by noting that no Building Code Enforcement against Appellants was before the Court. The Court of Appeals noted that Mr. Ahmad at the hearing argument said a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law was available to resist an enforcement action. (Opinion, p. 10) The Court of Appeals held that the writ actions were not supported by rational argument

on the law or the facts. It held the Trial Court had tenable grounds to grant the Town its attorney's fees and did not err. (Opinion, p. 11).

The Court of Appeals noted that the Town, citing RAP 18.9 and RCW 4.84.185, requested an award of its attorney's fees and costs for defending the frivolous appeal. The Court of Appeals correctly cited the rule of law that an appeal is frivolous if it raises no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ and is so totally devoid of merit that no reasonable possibility of reversal exists. (Opinion, at 11). Nevertheless, despite the fact that it had previously determined that there was no constitutional free exercise claim because no building code enforcement against the Appellants was before the Court of Appeals, it concluded without any analysis of the rules regarding frivolity on appeal that "the religious and federal based appeal arguments" were not entirely frivolous. The declination of the writs was proper. Appellants met none of the elements for either. RCW 7.16.290, RCW 7.16.300, RCW 7.16.160, RCW 7.16.170. There are no debatable issues. The Appellants' writ claims are totally devoid of merit.

V. FEE REQUEST

Town requests an award of attorney fees and expenses for preparation and filing of this answer. RAP 18.1(j).

VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should decline to accept Appellants' Petition for Review. The Appellant make no showing that complies with the requirements of RAP 13.4(b).

Respectfully submitted this 10 of April, 2014.

WITHERSPOON · KELLEY, PS

John M. Riley, III, WSBA No. 10804
Nathan G. Smith, WSBA No. 39699
Attorneys for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 10th day of April, 2014, I caused a copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO APPELLANT BEDREDDIN IMAN AND SAMEER HATEM'S PETITION FOR REVIEW to be served on the following by the method indicated:

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S0902708.DOC

OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK

From: OFFICE RECEPTIONIST, CLERK
Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 11:44 AM
To: 'Alicia Asplint'
Cc: John M. Riley III; Nathan G. Smith; Karina Hermanson; Shelly Koegler
Subject: RE: Supreme Court No. 85417-3 - Dawud Ahmad, et al., v. Town of Springdale

Rec'd 4-10-14

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From: Alicia Asplint [mailto:AliciaA@witherspoonkelley.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 10, 2014 11:39 AM
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Cc: John M. Riley III; Nathan G. Smith; Karina Hermanson; Shelly Koegler
Subject: Supreme Court No. 85417-3 - Dawud Ahmad, et al., v. Town of Springdale

Good morning,

Attached please find Respondent's Answer to Appellant Bedreddin Iman and Sameer Hatem's Petition for Review regarding:

Dawud Ahmad, Bedreddin Iman and Sameer Hatem, and Muslin America
vs.
Town of Springdale

Supreme Court Case No: 85417-3

Filed by John M. Riley, III, WSBA 10804, and Nathan G. Smith, WSBA 39699.

I would ask that the Clerk please file the above Answer to Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. Thank you.

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